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Weakening belief in the concept of free will yields pronounced effects upon social behavior,
typically promoting selﬁsh and aggressive over pro-social and helping tendencies. Belief
manipulations have furthermore been shown tomodulate basic and unconscious processes
involved in motor control and self-regulation.Yet, to date, it remains unclear how high-level
beliefs can impact such a wide range of behaviors. Here, we tested the hypothesis that
priming disbelief in free will diminishes the sense of agency, i.e., the intrinsic sensation
of being in control of one’s own actions. To this end, we measured participants’ implicit
and explicit self-agency under both anti-free will and control conditions. Priming disbelief
in free will reduced implicit but not explicit components of agency.These ﬁndings suggest
that free will beliefs have a causal impact on the pre-reﬂective feeling of being in control of
one’s actions, and solidify previous proposals that implicit and explicit agency components
tap into distinct facets of action awareness.
Keywords: free will, agency, self-control, unconscious, intentional binding
INTRODUCTION
The question of whether free will truly exists has fascinated
philosophers, psychologists, andneuroscientists for centuries (e.g.,
Libet et al., 1983;Wegner, 2004; Haggard, 2008). Yet contemporary
empirical research typically avoids the existential question itself,
and instead focuses on more tangible research questions concern-
ing the consequences of (dis)belief in free will, and its relation to
agentic causation and volition.
Seminal studies in the domain of social psychology have shown
that weakening belief in the concept of free will, via reading
of essays or statements that promote a determinist perspective,
seems to be capable of impacting participants’ subsequent social
behavior. For instance, Vohs and Schooler (2008) found that
participants whowere primedwith disbelief in freewill paid them-
selves a statistically unlikely and disproportionally large amount
of money, and took advantage of opportunities to cheat more
often than a group of control participants who read texts unre-
lated to free will. Likewise, Baumeister et al. (2009) found that a
similar manipulation was able to increase participants’ aggression
and decrease their helping behavior. These ﬁndings indicate that
free will beliefs might be crucial for maintaining the motivation
necessary to control selﬁsh impulses in favor of pro-social behav-
ior, in accordance with societal norms. Note, however, that there
is a considerable controversy in the literature about the impact of
free-will beliefs on behavioral control (e.g.,Miles, 2013) and recent
evidence indicates that believing in determinism may also have
arguably positive side effects such as reduced retributive attitudes
(see Shariff et al., 2014).
More recent work in the ﬁeld of experimental psychology has
revealed that the effects of weakening participants’ free will beliefs
are not restricted to complex social behavior, but even propa-
gate to very basic levels of motor control (Rigoni et al., 2011,
2013; Lynn et al., 2013). Using a similar procedure to that of
Vohs and Schooler (2008), Rigoni et al. (2011) found that induc-
ing disbelief in free will was associated with a reduced amplitude
of the readiness potential, an electrophysiological marker of pre-
conscious movement preparation (Libet et al., 1983). In follow-up
studies, it was found that weakening free will beliefs also inﬂu-
enced the effectiveness of other basic adaptive control processes,
such as post-error slowing (Rigoni et al., 2013) or the intentional
inhibition of pain avoidance behavior (Lynn et al., 2013). This
suggests that weakening free will beliefs counteracts the recruit-
ment of self-regulatory resources to adapt behavior in response to
environmental demands.
However, despite these recent advances in research on the
impact of free will beliefs on behavioral control, the mecha-
nisms underlying the crosstalk between high-level beliefs and
low-level sensorimotor processes remain poorly understood. To
explain their original ﬁnding regarding the readiness potential,
Rigoni et al. (2011) speculated that weakening free will beliefs may
reduce participants’ sense of agency, i.e., the intrinsic experience of
being in control of one’s own actions (for reviews see Gallagher,
2000; Haggard and Chambon, 2012). This altered experience may
then, in turn, hamper the recruitment of intentional effort for
action production. Yet, despite the principle plausibility of this
view, to date there exists only preliminary correlational supporting
evidence.
Building on the notion that belief in free will often co-occurs
with the pursuit of goal-directed behavior, Aarts and van den Bos
(2011) tested the possibility that free will beliefs are associated
with implicit processing of action-outcome relations underlying
goal-directed behavior. The authors compared participants with
either strong or weak dispositional free will beliefs in two differ-
ent tasks that tapped into implicit aspects of agentic experience:
(1) an intentional binding task, which measures the perceptual
attraction of an intentional action and its sensory outcomes in
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terms of time, and (2) an action-outcome priming task, which
assesses agency inferences resulting from a match between primed
and actual outcomes (see Moore and Obhi, 2012; van der Weiden
et al., 2013; for reviews). Aarts and van den Bos (2011) found that
strong dispositional free will beliefs were associated with greater
intentional binding and a stronger inﬂuence of primes on agency
inferences. These, alongwith related ﬁndings (Desantis et al., 2011;
Dogge et al., 2012), clearly indicate that free will beliefs and agency
are related. In particular, they suggest that free will beliefs mod-
ulate the strength of predictive signals about action-outcomes.
Nevertheless, given the correlational nature of the above study, a
causal link between the two concepts remains to be established.
Accordingly, the primary goal of the present study was to scruti-
nize the hypothesis that free will beliefs have a direct and causal
impact on the sense of agency. Such evidence would provide the
missing link to explain previous ﬁndings employing anti-free will
manipulations, and highlight a general mechanism through which
beliefs can affect even basic and unconscious adaptive processes.
To this end, we employed the same procedure to manipulate the
strength of free will beliefs as used in previous studies (e.g., Vohs
and Schooler, 2008) in a within-subjects design. Participants were
invited for two visits, in which they read essays that promoted
either disbelief in free will or outlined general statements about
consciousness (serving as a control condition).
Our secondary goal was to specify which aspects of agency
are related to free will beliefs. It has been argued that the sense
of agency constitutes a multi-dimensional construct comprising
both an implicit, pre-reﬂective, or non-conceptual component
that is related to lower-level perceptual and motor experiences,
and an explicit, reﬂective or conceptual component that is related
to higher-level thoughts and attributions (Synofzik et al., 2008).
The ﬁndings by Aarts and van den Bos (2011) indicate that free
will beliefs are related to implicit processes, yet, so far, it is unclear
to what extent their inﬂuence may propagate to the conscious,
deliberative level of explicit agency. Thus, in order to measure
the effects of the induction procedure on participants’ agency,
we used two different experimental paradigms. To assess implicit
components of agency, we employed an intentional binding task
(see above and Materials and Methods). To assess explicit compo-
nents of agency we used a modiﬁed version of the action-outcome
learning method introduced by Sato and Yasuda (2005). This task
requires participants to explicitly learn action-outcome relations
and to subsequently rate their perceived agency over the outcomes.
The beneﬁt of this latter task is that it is explicit at all levels
of processing; participants have full awareness of their actions
and the corresponding agency cues (see Meterials and Methods
section for a comprehensive description). Comparing the effects
of inducing disbelief in free will in these two tasks allowed us to
test our hypothesis that free will beliefs have a causal impact on
the sense of agency, for both implicit and explicit components of
agency.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Fifty-two students of Ghent University (aged 18–24; 40 males)
received a compensation of 16€ for their participation. The study
was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki,
and the approval of Ghent University’s Ethical Committee was
obtained in advance. All participants reported being naïve as to
the purpose of the experiment. One participant was excluded in
advance of analysis for failing to return for their second session.
PROCEDURE
Participants were individually tested during two sessions, tak-
ing place on the same weekday and time over two consecutive
weeks. Each participant completed one ‘control’ and one ‘anti-free
will’ session, with session order counterbalanced across partici-
pants. Each session began with participants reading one of two
possible essays by Francis Crick, “The General Nature of Con-
sciousness” or “A Postscript on Free Will” (Crick, 1995, pp. 13
and 265 respectively). To ensure a thorough reading of the mate-
rial and obfuscate the goal of the experiment, participants were
informed that they would be tested regarding the material at two
points during the session, and that memory retention was a major
outcome of interest. In the control session, the excerpt was a brief
historical overview of consciousness research, while the excerpt
read during the anti-free will session questioned the reality of free
will and posited that such a notion was pre-scientiﬁc (see Vohs
and Schooler, 2008 for a similar procedure). Participants were
invited to take as much time as they pleased to read and review
the texts. Following the readings, participants were asked to com-
plete the ﬁrst of two tasks (either the intentional binding task
or the ‘Sato’ task, see below), the order of which was counterbal-
anced across participants. Subsequent to the ﬁrst task, participants
were asked to write a brief essay summarizing the previously read
excerpt. Participants were then given the chance to reread the
text prior to commencing the second task. After the completion
of both tasks, participants were asked to ﬁll out four question-
naires in their ﬁrst session (the FAD+, the BIS/BAS, the LOC,
and the PANAS-X) and two in the second session (the FAD+
and PANAS-X). The FAD+ (Paulhus and Carey, 2011) is a 27-
item inventory that measures free will and deterministic beliefs,
and served as the basis for our manipulation check (e.g., “Peo-
ple must take full responsibility for any bad choices they make”).
The PANAS-X (Watson et al., 1988) measures current mood. The
BIS/BAS (Carver andWhite, 1994) is a measure of both behavioral
inhibition and behavioral activation (cf. Gray, 1982), while the
LOC (Rotter, 1966) measures a participant’s locus of control. The
latter questionnaires served exclusively as ﬁllers to shield partici-
pants from discovering the purpose of our experiment following
the ﬁrst session. Once participants had completed the question-
naires they received a written quiz on the essay, and in their
second session, a short debrieﬁng. The quiz was not scored but
only served to reinforce our cover story. The debrieﬁng question-
naire consistedof general questions regarding the experiment: how
participants felt about the duration of the experiment, whether
they felt their concentration slip, whether they had used any spe-
ciﬁc strategies, and ﬁnally, what they thought the purpose of the
experiment was.
MANIPULATION CHECK
To probe the general effectiveness of the manipulation in reducing
participants’ free will beliefs, we compared their scores on the free
will subscale of the FAD+ following the control and AFW sessions
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via paired samples t-tests (p = 0.05, one-tailed1). Moreover, we
computed a session-based difference score on the free will subscale
as an individual screening of a given participant’s response to the
manipulation. In previous studies, we observed that a small but
meaningful number of participants respond to the AFW manipu-
lation in a reactant way, i.e., they reported a stronger belief in free
will after reading an anti-free will text. Accordingly, we alsowanted
to explore how a reactant response affects the resulting level of
agency. To this end, we conducted (explorative) post hoc analyses
in which the data of responders (i.e., participants whose free will
beliefs were weakened in the AFW session) and reactant partici-
pants (i.e., participants whose free will beliefs were augmented in
the AFW session) were analyzed separately.
INTENTIONAL BINDING TASK
As a measure of implicit agency components, we used a mod-
iﬁed version of the ‘intentional binding’ method introduced by
Haggard et al. (2002a,b). Intentional binding refers to the tem-
poral attraction of an action and its sensory effects within the
actor’s perception (see Moore and Obhi, 2012, for a review). In
this task, participants made time judgments about either actions
or sensory events (tones) while these events occurred together
or in isolation. They attended to the image of a centrally pre-
sented circular clock face (diameter = 8 cm) consisting of 60
dots (diameter = 2 mm). On every trial, a circular clock hand
(diameter = 4 mm) rotated clockwise along the dots at a rate of
3 s per rotation, starting from an unpredictable clock hand posi-
tion. Four different block types were employed, differing with
respect to the event to be judged (action vs. tone) and whether
or not there was an instrumental relation between actions and
1We employed one-tailed signiﬁcance tests in all comparisons for whichwe had clear
directional expectations. This is the case for the comparison of intentional binding
scores or agency ratings between the AFW session and control session (where we
expected the AFW manipulation to decrease participants’ agency). However, this is
not the case for undirected comparisons (e.g., the test between the frequency of left-
and right-hand responses in the acquisition phase of the Sato task).
tones (agency vs. baseline). In the agency conditions, participants
were instructed to press a response key (keyboard space bar) with
their right hand at a moment of their choosing. Their responses
were followed by a brief sine wave tone (frequency = 600 Hz,
duration = 75 ms) presented via headphones at a delay of 250 ms,
while the clockhand continued rotating for anunpredictable inter-
val (varied between 1000 and 2000 ms in steps of 250 ms) and then
disappeared. After the clock hand disappeared, participants were
prompted to indicate the perceived time of either their button
press (agency action) or the tone onset (agency tone) by manually
selecting (mouse clicks) the corresponding clock hand position. In
the two baseline conditions, temporal judgments weremade about
actions (baseline action) or about tones (baseline tone) when these
events occurred in isolation. Participants performed 20 trials for
each block type, resulting in 80 trials overall. The block order
was counterbalanced across subjects. To estimate individual inten-
tional binding scores, we ﬁrst calculated the mean judgment errors
(i.e., the deviance betweenperceived vs. actual timepoints of either
actions or tones) for each block type and experimental session.
Thereafter, binding scores were calculated for actions and for tones
by subtracting judgment errors in the agency blocks from those in
the corresponding baseline blocks. Finally, the overall amount of
intentional binding was computed by adding the absolute values
of both binding scores (see Figure 1, for a graphical illustration
of the task). Mean judgment errors were analyzed in a general lin-
ear model (GLM) with the within-subjects factors JUDGMENT
(action vs. tone), AGENCY (baseline vs. agency) and SESSION
(control vs. anti-free will). To test whether intentional binding
was modulated by the free will manipulation, we conducted post
hoc paired-samples t-tests between the overall intentional bind-
ing scores in the control session and the anti-free will session
(one-tailed; p < 0.05).
SATO TASK
To assess explicit components of agency, we employed an adapted
version of the task introduced by Sato and Yasuda (2005). The
FIGURE 1 | Illustration of the single-trial structure of the intentional binding task (adapted from Demanet et al., 2013).
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rationale of this task is grounded in ideomotor theory (e.g., Prinz,
1997; Elsner and Hommel, 2001), and the task entails two distinct
experimental phases. In an initial acquisition phase, novel action-
effect associations are explicitly formed by means of frequent and
contingent pairing of simple responses and resulting sensory out-
comes. In a subsequent test phase, participants perform the same
task and judge their perceived agency over the action-outcome,
while both the congruency of the action effect (compared to the
acquisition phase) and its delay are manipulated.
In the acquisition phase, trials started with the presentation
of the outline of a white square in the center of the screen.
Participants were instructed to press either the NUM-del (with
their right index ﬁnger) or NUM-enter button (with their right
middle ﬁnger). Immediately after a response was given, the
white square was replaced by a colored square with a speciﬁc
color being assigned to each response (red and blue in one ses-
sion, and yellow and green in the other; sequence of color sets
counterbalanced across subjects). Participants were instructed
to freely choose their responses in each trial, but to try to
achieve an equal overall frequency of both responses without
using a particular strategy such as simple alternations between
left and right responses. Altogether, the acquisition phase com-
prised 200 trials, a number of repetitions that has been shown to
be sufﬁcient to establish strong action-effect representations (see
Elsner and Hommel, 2001).
In the test phase, participants were told that on some trials
their action would cause the colored square to appear on the
screen, while on other trials the computer would cause the col-
ored square, and their task would be to infer the originator. Trials
were similar to the acquisition phase with the following modiﬁca-
tions: the color of the produced square was either congruent (i.e.,
the same color that a particular response produced in the acqui-
sition phase) or incongruent (i.e., the color that was previously
produced by the other response). Moreover, the delay between
action and outcome was manipulated so that the colored square
appeared on the screen either immediately after the response was
given or at a delay of either 300 or 600 ms. Finally, after the col-
ored square disappeared from the screen, participants were asked
to rate their perceived agency over the action-outcome (i.e., their
certainty that they had caused the square to appear on the screen).
To this end, a Likert scale was presented and participants indi-
cated their answers on a scale from 1 to 4, with one representing
absolute certainty that the computer had produced the square and
four representing absolute certainty that the square was produced
by oneself. Ratings were given with the left hand ﬁngers using the
buttons ‘Z,’ ‘X,’ ‘C,’ and ‘V’ of a QWERTY keyboard. Importantly,
to avoid a contamination of the ratings by response biases, two
different rating scales were presented across trials (randomly inter-
mixed). These two scales were of opposite polarity (i.e., starting
from 1 on the left to 4 on the right or vice versa). Prior to start-
ing the test phase, participants were familiarized with the general
task and the rating procedure. They ﬁrst performed ten practice
trials in which only the rating scales were presented followed by
another ten practice trials with the complete task, supervised by
the experimenter.
For both experimental phases, we ﬁrst computed the propor-
tion of left and right hand responses and the mean response times
(RTs). Both scores were compared between the control session and
the anti-free will session via paired-samples t-tests (two-tailed).
Agency ratings of the test phase were analyzed in a GLM using the
within-subjects factors CONGRUENCY (congruent vs. incongru-
ent), DELAY (0 vs. 300 vs. 600 ms), and SESSION (Control vs.
Anti-free will).
RESULTS
BELIEF MANIPULATION
The comparison of participants’ FAD+ scores between the control
session and the anti-free will session conﬁrmed that participants
reported stronger determinist beliefs in the anti-free will session
than in the control session, t50 = 2.885, p = 0.003, Cohen’s
d = 0.211 (Control: M = 2.88, SD = 0.64; Anti-free will:
M = 3.01, SD = 0.59). Moreover, the aforementioned screening
procedure of individual difference scores (see Meterials and Meth-
ods section) identiﬁed eleven reactant participants who reported
stronger free will beliefs in the anti-free will session than in
the control session. A post hoc ANOVA on participants’ FAD+
scores, with SESSION as a within-subjects factor and GROUP
(Responder vs. Reactant) as a between-subjects factor, revealed
a signiﬁcant interaction such that responders exhibited stronger
free will beliefs in the control session than in the anti-free will
session, whereas the opposite pattern was found for reactant
participants, F1,49 = 34.414, p < 0.001, d = 2.366 (Respon-
ders: Control Session M = 2.761, SD = 0.095; Anti-free will
Session M = 2.986, SD = 0.094; Reactants: Control Session
M = 3.325, SD = 0.181; Anti-free will Session M = 3.078,
SD = 0.180).
INTENTIONAL BINDING TASK
The GLM revealed a signiﬁcant main effect of AGENCY,
F1,50 = 6.28, p = 0.015, and a marginally signiﬁcant trend
of JUDGMENT, F1,50 = 3.032, p = 0.088. In addition, the
interaction between JUDGMENT and AGENCY was signiﬁcant,
F1,50 = 36.874, p < 0.001, indicating that actions were per-
ceived as occurring later in the agency blocks than in the baseline
blocks (Judgment errors: Baseline M = −0.184 ms, SE = 6.899;
Agency M = 25.701 ms, SE = 8.578), whereas the opposite
was observed with tone judgments (Baseline M = 58.217 ms,
SE = 7.892; Agency M = −4.448 ms, SE = 11.922). This
pattern reﬂects a replication of the general intentional binding
effect (Haggard et al., 2002a). Most importantly, the three-way
interaction between JUDGEMENT, AGENCY, and SESSION was
at trend-level, F1,50 = 2.863, p = 0.097, and reached signif-
icance in a one-tailed t-test between the intentional binding
scores of the control session (M = 100.116 ms, SE = 18.104)
and the anti-free will session (M = 76.973 ms, SE = 13.822),
t50 = 1.692; p = 0.048, d = 0.248. This one-tailed test can be
justiﬁed by the directional expectation that weakening free will
beliefs would diminish the sense of agency (see Figure 2). All
other main effects and interaction terms were non-signiﬁcant (all
p > 0.39).
Thereafter, we conducted explorative post hoc analyses in
which intentional binding scores were analyzed separately for
responders and reactant participants (see methods section). In
the group of responders, the intentional binding scores were
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FIGURE 2 | Results of the intentional binding task. Bars display mean
binding scores and SEs for actions, tones and composite scores of both,
separately for control and anti-free will conditions.
signiﬁcantly decreased in the anti-free will session (Control ses-
sion M = 106.866 ms, SE = 21.202; Anti-free will session
M = 71.360 ms, SE = 15.065), t39 = 2.260; p = 0.015,
d = 0.282. By contrast, in the reactant group, intentional
binding scores did not differ and were in fact numerically
reversed, with the anti-free will session showing greater binding
scores (Control session M = 75.569 ms, SE = 33.856; Anti-
free will session M = 97.381 ms, SE = 34.015), t10 = 0.909;
p = 0.193, d = 0.093 (see Figure 3). Thus, although only
of exploratory value, this analysis indicates that the overall
effect of the belief manipulation on intentional binding was
related to the individual effectiveness of the belief manipula-
tion.
FIGURE 3 | Intentional binding composite scores for reactant and
responder participants, separately for control and AFW sessions. Error
bars represent SEs.
SATO TASK: ACQUISITION PHASE
The analysis of participants’ RTs and response choices revealed
that performance in the acquisition phase did not differ between
the control session and the anti-free will session (RT: Con-
trol = 293.2 ms; Anti-free will = 299.9 ms; percentage of left and
right responses: Control = 49.6 vs. 50.4%; Anti-free will = 51.8
vs. 48.2%; all p > 0.05).
SATO TASK: TEST PHASE
As in the acquisition phase, the proportion of response choices
and the RTs did not differ between the two sessions (RT: Con-
trol = 320.1 ms; Anti-free will = 326.6 ms; percentage of left and
right responses: Control = 52.8 vs. 47.2%; Anti-free will = 50.4
vs. 49.6%; all p > 0.05). Moreover, the analysis of participants’
agency ratings revealed a signiﬁcant main effect of CONGRU-
ENCY, F1,50 = 96.692, p < 0.001, indicating higher agency
ratings on congruent trials than on incongruent trials (Congruent
M = 3.070, SE = 0.081; Incongruent M = 1.698, SE = 0.080).
The main effect of DELAY was signiﬁcant as well, F1,50 = 48.022,
p < 0.001, reﬂecting a progressive decrease of agency rating with
the length of the delay (0 ms delay, M = 2.900, SE = 0.069;
300 ms delay M = 2.204, SE = 0.067; 600 ms delay M = 2.049,
SE = 0.065). Both effects are replications of previous studies on
explicit agency components (e.g., Sato and Yasuda, 2005; Spen-
gler et al., 2009). In addition, there was a signiﬁcant interaction
between CONGRUENCY and DELAY, F1,50 = 16.605, p < 0.001,
reﬂecting a stronger delay effect for congruent effects than for
incongruent effects (see Figure 4). Importantly, neither the main
effect of SESSION was signiﬁcant, F1,50 = 1.118, p = 0.295,
nor any interaction term involving this factor (all p > 0.203).
Thus, our results replicated previous observations that congru-
ency with prior action-effect contingencies, along with as the
delay of the action-outcome, affects the explicit components of
agency (Sato and Yasuda, 2005; Spengler et al., 2009). By contrast,
agency ratings were not affected by the manipulation of free will
beliefs.
As in the intentional binding section, we next conducted the
post hoc analyses in which the data of responders and reactants
were analyzed separately. In both groups, however, the same pat-
tern was evident as in the main analysis (i.e., signiﬁcant main
effects of CONGRUENCY, DELAY, and a signiﬁcant interaction
between the two factors, but non-signiﬁcant main effects of SES-
SION and interaction terms involving this factor). Thus, contrary
to the intentional binding data, explicit agency ratings were not
inﬂuenced by the effectiveness of the belief manipulation.
COMPARISON BETWEEN IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT AGENCY
In a ﬁnal analysis aimed at directly comparing the effects of the
belief manipulation on explicit and implicit components, we con-
ducted an ANOVA with factors TASK (Intentional Binding vs.
Sato) and SESSION. As the two tasks have quite different metrics,
we Z-normalized both the overall intentional binding score from
each session (intentional binding task) and the average agency
rating across all conditions (Sato task). This ANOVA revealed
non-signiﬁcant main effects of TASK (due to the normalization)
and SESSION, F1,50 = 0.144, p = 0.706, but a signiﬁcant interac-
tion between the two factors, F1,50 = 4.985, p = 0.030, conﬁrming
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FIGURE 4 | Results of the Sato task. Values indicate mean agency ratings as a function of congruency, delay, and belief conditions.
that implicit and explicit components of agency were differentially
affected by the manipulation.
DISCUSSION
The aim of the present study was to probe whether weakening
belief in the concept of free will would have a causal impact on
participants’ sense of agency. In line with our hypothesis, we
found that intentional binding was signiﬁcantly reduced in the
anti-free will condition, indicating that determinist beliefs ham-
per the implicit sensation of being in control of one’s actions. By
contrast, participants’ explicit agency ratings were not affected by
the belief manipulation.
FREE WILL BELIEFS AND SELF-CONTROL
The present study complements and extends a growing body of
research on the interaction between high-level determinist beliefs
and low-level processes involved in self-control. Previous stud-
ies have shown that participants induced to disbelieve in free
will exhibit less involvement in motor preparation (Rigoni et al.,
2011), donot adapt their behavior in response to unwanted action-
outcomes (Rigoni et al., 2013), and are less inclined to engage in
effortful cancellation of prepotent behavior (Rigoni et al., 2012;
Lynn et al., 2013). Our ﬁndings add several new and valuable
insights to this existing literature. First and foremost, establishing a
causal linkbetweendeterminist beliefs and the sense of agencypro-
vides an integrative mechanism that explains how free will beliefs
impact behavioral control in a variety of contexts. It is possible
that free will beliefs are able to inﬂuence the entire action cycle by
intervening at an early or pre-reﬂective level. This impact on sen-
sorimotor binding then cascades to more overt behavior, eliciting
in turn less intentional effort, a reduced sense of agency, and less
feeling of responsibility. Interestingly, a recent study has linked the
intentional binding effect to the feeling of responsibility (Moretto
et al., 2011). The authors employed a modiﬁed intentional bind-
ing paradigm in which actions had unpredictable consequences,
either in amoral context or a simple economic context. Intentional
binding was enhanced when actions were embedded in a moral
context, suggesting binding is sensitive to a feeling of responsibility
over self-produced action consequences. It is tempting to speculate
that an intrinsic bias to bind actions with their outcomes in time
could constitute a building block of higher-order social cognition,
and in light of these ﬁndings it becomes more apparent why the
manipulation of free will beliefs can impact such a wide range of
behaviors.
Finally, from a methodological perspective, our study is the ﬁrst
to employ a successful within-subjects manipulation of free will
beliefs. As such, it provides more direct evidence for the causal
impact of high-level beliefs, since pre-existing differences between
different groups of participants can be ruled out as an alternative
explanation. Moreover, having established the feasibility of this
manipulation in within-subjects designs may permit its applica-
tion in new experimental settings, e.g., in combination with brain
imaging techniques such as fMRI.
IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT COMPONENTS OF AGENCY
Beyond establishing a causal link between free will beliefs and
agency, our data revealed marked differences between implicit
and explicit components of agency. While intentional binding
scores were reduced in the anti-free will session, the explicit
agency ratings in the Sato task were not affected. This observa-
tion is interesting for several reasons. First, it indicates that the
inﬂuence of free will beliefs on agency does not extend to the
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level of reﬂective deliberation. Instead, beliefs seem to bias very
basic and implicit processes that underlie our pre-reﬂective self-
perception as intentional agents. In cases where the integration of
agency cues into judgment is transparent, explicit processes may
override the modulation of pre-reﬂective prediction processes. In
addition, the dissociation between implicit and explicit agency
components also speaks against the possibility that our data may
originate from “demand effects” (i.e., participants form expecta-
tions about the purpose of the experiment and try to please the
experimenter by fulﬁlling his/her hypotheses). Finally, on a theo-
retical level, this result corroborates the notion that the sense of
agency is not a unitary psychological concept, but rather entails
distinct components that tap into different facets of action aware-
ness (see David et al., 2008; Synofzik et al., 2008; Obhi and Hall,
2011). In line with this view, a recent study indicated that explicit
and implicit components might operate at different time scales.
Ebert and Wegner (2010) employed a paradigm that simulta-
neously assessed implicit and explicit agency components in a
relatively naturalistic task setting. Participants were instructed to
push or pull a lever, causing objects on a screen to either come
closer or move further away from them. As in the present study,
the authors manipulated the congruency between actions and
outcomes, and the outcome delay. It was found that both mea-
sures were inﬂuenced by action-outcome congruency (i.e., both
implicit and explicit agency was higher for congruent outcomes).
However, the inﬂuence of congruency was more pronounced
for explicit agency, particularly with long outcome delays, sug-
gesting that implicit components may operate on a shorter time
scale.
LIMITATIONS AND OUTLOOK
Despite the clear overall patterns of results, several aspects of our
data indicate the need for further investigation. First, it must be
considered that the effect of the belief manipulation on IB reached
signiﬁcance only in a one-tailed t-test. The post hoc analyses indi-
cated that this was likely due to the variability in participants’
responses to the manipulation: There was a robust attenuation of
intentional binding in the group of responders, but in the group
of reactant participants this effect was not only absent but even
reversed numerically. On the one hand, this ﬁnding is reassur-
ing, as it conﬁrms that the effect is related to the effectiveness of
the belief manipulation. On the other hand, it raises new ques-
tions, in particular what determines an individual’s response, and
whether a reactant response only eliminates the effects of the free
will manipulation or if it can even increase agency as compared to
a control session. The rather small number of reactant subjects in
our sample prohibits us from making conclusions about this issue.
Furthermore, the precise nature of the implicit processes respond-
ing to free will beliefs remains to be uncovered through future
research. While intentional binding has primarily been related to
motor prediction, the ﬁndings of Aarts and van den Bos (2011)
indicate that non-motor predictive and inferential processesmight
be affected as well. Future studies should also attempt to mini-
mize confounds of the predominant free-will belief manipulation
(e.g., differences in the length or the emotionality of the anti-
free will text and the control text) so that ﬁndings can be more
unequivocally attributed to the strength of free will beliefs.
CONCLUSION
The present study revealed that inducing disbelief in the concept
of free will has a causal impact on implicit components of agency,
but not on explicit agency components. This ﬁnding points to a
psychological mechanism through which determinist beliefs exert
their wide-ranging inﬂuence on human behavior, and highlights
the multi-dimensional nature of the sense of agency.
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